Numerus clausus restored?

Historically, the idea behind the removal of the numerus clausus for entry into the various faculties of our university was to avoid coercing students in their choice of their course of studies and career on the basis of utilitarian or demand - based reasoning, all in the name of democratisation of higher education.

There was resistance, at the time, on the part of some faculties. The Faculty of Medicine and Surgery, for example, argued that it should hold on to the numerus clausus on the basis of the ratio of teaching hospital beds to students.

This argument actually backfired because this ratio was locally very favourable and did not constitute a bottle neck for student admission potential. This latter consideration was confirmed by an in depth study on student intake and needs, commissioned by the Faculty of Medicine and Surgery in June 2004, which indicated, amongst other things, that the limiting factor for student intake numbers was the teaching staff component in the clinical part of the course and not the number of teaching hospital beds.

The removal of the numerus clausus has resulted in a lopsided admission to the various faculties and is also linked to the very high failure rate in the initial years in the faculties with very high intake. In the post graduate sphere similar liberal attitudes have resulted in unsustainable manpower situations, with glut in some specialties and extreme dearth in others. The harmful social, economical and educational effects, as well as the consequent management problems are obvious.

It is becoming clear that it is time for some sort of control, direct or indirect, on student intake and speciality choice. This could: (1) provide a flexible tool for the regulation of the number of graduates in the various disciplines; (2) provide a way of handling the less meriting foreign students (most of whom are now non-paying students when they come from EU countries) from joining our university when they are driven away from their home country by failed admission tests or high fees; (3) strengthen the students' resolve to do well. There is some evidence to suggest that the more able students are more likely to apply for the more selective faculties and institutions; (4) perhaps help to reduce the high failure rate in the initial years and therefore increase the university's efficiency and curb waste and (5) help the university to be less socially selective (contrary to what one would initially think) by directing resources saved by the increased efficiency towards students coming from disadvantaged backgrounds.

So what methods of control could one adopt? Though the idea of the numerus clauses should not be barred completely, it should be reserved for very particular faculties where the problems cannot be resolved otherwise. Generally one could think of less imposing and more liberal solutions such as differential incentives.

To induce students to choose courses which are relevant to pressing service needs, that is, what is socially useful, these incentives have to be quite strong. The corollary of this is that there should be a disincentive in the direction where society is saturated or even super-saturated.

Further input in this direction could only result in frustration for the new graduates, who run the risk of being exploited due to the supply/demand imbalance. There are faculties where this has already happened.

One could think of various incentives: the most obvious would be differentiating the stipend in a way that socially useful courses, that is, where there is dire need for graduates, are allotted a high stipend, which may be withheld from courses where there is super-saturation. There would of course be a whole spectrum in between these two poles. The high stipend given to certain courses should be linked to the student's performance, to guard against misuse of the system in the first years.

This system has a flaw in that a highly qualified student coming from a low income family, could be deterred from entering the faculty of his choice which falls into 'saturated' bracket and is therefore not linked to a stipend. A combination of incentives could be devised to counter this effect. For example, a limited number of stipends could be reserved for brilliant students coming from low income brackets, entering faculties where there is saturation and where the stipend is otherwise suspended.

It is obvious that these are dilemmas which require decision making in an atmosphere of relative uncertainty. But isn't this what happens with most of our professional problems and even those relating to our daily lives? Having collected sufficient data and avoided the trap of a continuous accumulation of, one should have the courage and the intellect to make close-call decisions, accepting the inevitable trade-offs. Since one is aware that the factors involved in one's projections can alter with time, one should make the rules flexible and revisable at stated intervals. One should not, however, be afraid of change. After all, though change does not necessarily mean progress, there can be no progress without change.