Editorial

The news from Riyadh in the wake of meetings held between Saudi Arabia and Iran that the Iranian President was prepared to go along with an Arab peace plan to bring the conflict between Israel and Palestine to an end, has not been confirmed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. There may be a number of reasons to explain his reluctance.

The first and most significant is that if he goes along with such a peace plan, he is acknowledging Israel's right to existence, a right he has so far denied. Not only denied, of course; Mr Ahmadinejad has insisted, over and over again, that the elimination of Israel as a state is cardinal to Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East.

A second, more subtle reason is that he may be banking on some public renunciation of the peace plan by Israel. Drawn up in 2002, the plan refers to the right of return of Palestinians to Israel. This right of return creates seemingly impossible problems for Israel. Iran would dearly love Israel to publicly dismiss Saudi Arabia's declaration and to use this as a reason for its own non-acceptance.

The United States will no doubt urge caution on Israel at this stage and argue that it would be best, in the aftermath of the Saudi declaration, to let Iran face international pressure to go along with the plan. If Iran does, and by so doing automatically accepts Israel's right to exist - which will in turn mean that Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine will face pressure to follow Iran's example - the possibility of unblocking the stalemate that currently exists is greatly increased. But, as we keep learning and re-learning, nothing is ever quite straightforward in that region.

Much will depend on the United States. The situation in Iraq remains uppermost in George W. Bush's mind. If any more proof were needed it was provided by his agreement to have American envoys sitting with Syrian and Iranian delegations at a conference in Baghdad organised by Iraq for later this month.

When the recommendation to "engage constructively" in Iraq was first made to the President by the Baker-Hamilton Study Group on Iraq, Mr Bush did not leap at it.

That he is giving it a try more than suggests that he is being advised that doing so will be of benefit to the situation in Iraq. Whether in fact there will be movement remains to be seen. It is prudent to be less than optimistic and more than pessimistic.

What emerges from these developments puts into stark relief just how fragile and kaleidoscopic is the situation in the entire region. Iran and Syria and, indeed, many of its so-called friends, would dearly love to see the United States fail in Iraq. Moderate Arab countries would just as dearly love to see the Americans succeed, but with their help, so that they can shore up their own reputation with their people. The Americans would dearly love to succeed, not least because failure is too alarming an alternative. Success would also mean that they could contribute more cogently to a successful conclusion to the Israeli-Palestinian question.

Iran has an interest in keeping the situation in Iraq and Israel on the boil, which is why it supplies Hamas, Hizbollah and the Sunni insurgency in Iraq with arms. It also nurses an ambition to become a nuclear power. The latter ambition is anathema, or so it appears, to the European Union, Russia, China and the United States. All of which, added to the possibility that Saudi Arabia's  week-end declaration will come a cropper in Teheran or Tel Aviv, makes the region not so much a melting pot as a tinderbox surrounded by lit matches.