Future prospects and likely scenarios

Chatham house is how the Royal Institute of International Affairs is often referred to. Their outgoing director, Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, who gave his inaugural lecture on the eve of 9/11, is due to end his term today.

He recently gave a valedictory, which besides providing him with an opportunity to draw on the lessons learnt while at Chatham House, also allowed him to speculate about the future.

The full title of his lecture was "Living with two megapowers: the world in 2020".

In the same breath he also wrote a separate piece about Tony Blair's foreign policy and its likely impact on his possible successor(s).

Both studies are worth reflecting upon, if anything, for the deep insight that they provide, even if one were to disagree with certain conclusions.

Bulmer-Thomas argues that 2020 may seem a long time ahead but according to him it is not simply because the next President of the United States, if re-elected, will still be in power in January 2017. The next President of France could still be in office in the same year. The next generation of China's leaders, if reappointed, will hold office until 2022 and if David Cameron became Britain's Prime Minister after the next general election, he could quite easily still be in power in 2020.

The main question he poses is whether we will have moved away from the world of 2006 in which there is only one megapower. He comes up with one of the best definitions of power:

Power in international affairs has to do with the ability to shape the world as far as possible in one's own image through constructing a set of rules by which others will abide.

The United States

His first assessment concerns the US as a megapower.

Claiming that the US ranks No. 1 in terms of military force and political power, he is of the opinion that the world we live in today is still very largely shaped by global institutions and rules - both written and unwritten - that owe a great deal to US influence. He also considers it to be roughly equal with the EU in terms of economic strength and to still rank as a major source of cultural attraction despite the perception of the US abroad having become much less positive in recent years.

He also believes that while the US is also likely to rank high in terms of political power, it will not be as dominant as today. The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq will reduce, for at least a decade, the number of its citizens convinced that the use of US power abroad can be a force for good. He also thinks that US economic weight will have fallen by 2020 relative to the rest of the world, although it will still be the world's largest economy, at least in terms of GDP measured at market prices.

US values will not be as widely shared as in the past, and US popular culture will decline as the country's goods and services face greater competition from other sources.

Future US administrations will continue to find it difficult to master the art of public diplomacy given the negative perceptions of America in many parts of the world.

The outgoing director of Chatham House states that isolation is not an option for the US, but a more neo-realist approach to international affairs certainly is.

He feels that self-belief runs deep in the US and it would be a mistake to assume that it will have completely lost its force by 2020.

The director makes the point that even if the world will have ceased to be unipolar by 2020, that does not mean it will necessarily be bipolar.

The EU

The EU scores high in terms of economic growth and will continue to do so. By 2020 it may also have the world's most important reserve currency.

The instruments of public policy to promote regional interests will continue to favour carrots over sticks with the EU collectively being the largest donor of foreign aid.

The fact that there neither is nor will there be sufficient political will to move to qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy and that there is too great a divergence among the states of the EU on the fundamentals of security policy to achieve consensus, will prevent the EU from turning itself into a megapower even though individual states - particularly France and the UK - may still punch above their weight in foreign and security matters.

Russia and India

The author considers Russia's chances of becoming a megapower by 2020 to be very poor. He argues that it is in demographic decline and that it has become a petro-state and therefore vulnerable to negative external shocks from the energy market.

Claiming that Russia's army is a conscript one and subject to low morale, he argues that the Russian Federation appears to be defending old positions rather than staking out new ones.

He bases most of his conclusions on the 'theory' that the current Russian leadership may have the self-belief that is a prerequisite for a megapower, but it will be too concerned with maintaining the status quo in the next 15 years to go much beyond its present status.

In the case of India, despite its ancient culture and rich history, it is classified as a forward-looking country with a young and growing population that looks to the future with confidence.

Yet its chances of becoming a megapower by 2020 are also considered to be very modest. In his conclusion, Bulmer-Thomas states that although India might become a regional power, it will not become a global power and certainly not a megapower.

The other megapower

As far as China is concerned, even though it is not yet a megapower, it is likely to change in the next 15 years. Its military expenditure is growing rapidly and is expected to be close to $400 bn in 2020. It will also strenuously seek to convert a significant part of its international financial assets into real assets through strategic overseas purchases.

Apart from its UN Security Council veto powers, it will have a much bigger share of votes in those international organisations where voting is determined by economic weight.

Despite certain obstacles that lie ahead there are strong reasons to believe that China will adapt to each of these challenges without undermining its long-run rate of development. A world of two megapowers by 2020 is therefore a real possibility.

Regarding the international priorities of the US and China, whichever party is in power, in the US, it is safe to assume that the main US priority will be homeland security.

The rhetoric may move away from the 'war on terror' but the reality will remain the same for many years to come.

Even though the rise of Al-Qaeda-type terrorism is not considered to have been uniform or linear, the interface between the US and the Muslim world is too prone to accidents, to misunderstandings and to occasional rank incompetence.

Arguing that none of the following will be achieved quickly, the outgoing Chatham House director lists the following as preconditions for the demise of the Al-Qaeda franchise:

• much improved socio-economic and political conditions for young people in the Muslim - especially Arab - world

• the rise of a new generation of Muslims in developed countries with a greater stake in their host nation's future, and

• a resolution of the long-standing Arab-Israeli dispute.

Apart from continuing to focus on the Middle East and North Africa, the US is expected to have as second priority the containment of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while a third priority will be greater emphasis on migration control for both political and security reasons.

Energy security will also remain a key priority for the US. For China the main priority will be political stability. Its economic transformation under way is considered to be likely to take much more than 15 years.

Although a period of strategic rivalry between the US and China is to be expected, this is not likely to lead to open conflict since economic ties between the two countries will be close and each country will have a strong stake in the economic success of the other.

A nuclear war between the two megapowers is considered inconceivable, their economies will be closely linked, and the Chinese leadership recognises that a major rise in tension will undermine its hopes of economic transformation and political stability.

Both megapowers are being considered to be prepared to pay little more than lip service to strengthening international law and adopting new international treaties.

On a negative note, the geo-strategic analyst concludes that neither megapower will have a great interest in United Nations reform, while public opinion in the US is contemptuous of the UN as it is seen as too bureaucratic and too unwieldy to serve US purposes.

Regarding the UK itself, Bulmer-Thomas feels that it will not make much difference who is in power in the United States.

There is very little, apart from intelligence-sharing, that a US government can do to reward the UK without rewarding other states.

A closer relationship with Europe is not only a requirement of British foreign policy, it is also likely to be urged on Britain by future US Presidents.

To be taken seriously by its European partners and contribute fully to the European project, in due course, this might require the UK to revisit its opposition to joining both the Schengen agreement and the Eurozone.

Bulmer-Thomas's legacy and vision will definitely live on.

leo.brincat@gov.mt

Mr Brincat is the Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs and IT.