Lebanon: regional dynamics and internal tensions

While writing this article three major developments have just surfaced.

The assassination of Lebanese Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel has just hit the headlines. We had met for three-quarters of an hour at his rundown party headquarters when I was on a fact-finding mission to Beirut on behalf of the Council of Europe. He was very open to a future dialogue with the international organisation I represented.

Although soft-spoken and quite unassuming, the young anti-Syrian Christian leader's death was the latest in a series of killings of prominent Lebanese figures who were critical of Syria. Even though not considered a high-flying component of the Siniora Cabinet he was still regarded as a potent political symbol of the Christian community in Lebanon.

What is even more disturbing was not only that this Phalange dynasty has been the victim of yet another assassination but it came at a time when the political power struggle in Lebanon was already taking new turns in recent weeks. I still have his visiting card with personal cell phone number written in ink. Talking to him one could hardly detect the sense of drama and tragedy that has touched his family over the years. In fact there was almost a sense of optimism in the way he appraised Lebanon's future in its pre-July war days.

Though I have reservations about the track record of Phalangist policies in Lebanese history I sincerely hope that his killing, which I condemn, will not destabilise Lebanon further nor cause civil unrest. During the 1975-90 civil war, the Phalange party was the most formidable force within the Christian camp and it shouldered the brunt of the fighting against the PLO.

Only a day before the assassination, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called on his allies to stand ready for a peaceful demonstration to demand a national unity government to replace what he termed the current "unconstitutional" Cabinet.

Nasrallah offered two solutions to the country's ongoing crisis: the formation of a national unity government or early parliamentary elections. He dismissed claims that Hizbollah was trying to block the project of the international tribunal that would try the assassins of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

On the same day it was announced that Iran had invited the Iraqi and Syrian Presidents to Tehran for a weekend summit with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Both Iran and Syria are seen as key players in Iraq. According to Al Jazeera, Syria is widely believed to have done little to stop foreign fighters and Al-Qaeda recruits from crossing its border to join Sunni fighters in Iraq while Iran is accused of arming and supporting Shi'a fighters.

Meanwhile political analysts in the United States have been changing tack; they are now claiming that Damascus did not commission Hizbollah's raid into Israel but it did see the ensuing crisis as a chance to prove its importance, while other conservative sources have just stated that reports that Iran prodded Hizbollah to attack Israel to divert attention from the Iranian nuclear programme seem to be false.

The worsening situation in Lebanon itself can be attributed to an uncomfortable mix of regional dynamics and internal tensions.

The influential Foreign Affairs magazine has just concluded that Hizbollah has become much more independent of Damascus and that most likely, high level Syrian officials did not even know about the July 12 raid until after it happened.

Which begs the question: so why is the situation deteriorating in Lebanon itself?

Having ended up in a full-scale war in which it won some victories in the field and popularity in the Arab and Muslim world Hizbollah has found that despite the price it has had to pay for its attack, it has widened its tactical and political options within Lebanon itself.

Despite unleashing massive airpower on Hizbollah strongholds, Israel failed to knock out the organisation or even to stop its missile attacks, while the setbacks suffered by Israel's ground invasion punctured the aura of invincibility long projected by the Israel Defence Forces.

While many thought that the fact that there were no outright winners of the war could have led to a more stable Lebanon that could help secure a true regional peace, things have turned out quite differently.

The very fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was seen as an important step toward a stable and sovereign Lebanon could be perceived by many as shoring up the Lebanese government which many consider to be too close to the United States.

Lebanon was the net loser in the war in the sense that it suffered horribly and though its fledgling democratic government survived militarily it was forced to stand by helplessly during the crisis.

One might argue whether Hizbollah or Israel came out ahead, but it is clear that Lebanon - both its people and its government - had lost.

The Lebanese government suffered the ultimate indignity for any regime: it was ignored.

Once again it became clear to all factions in Lebanon that their government cannot protect them either from foreign threats or from strong domestic groups like Hizbollah.

Although it might not admit it publicly, Israel has been reminded by recent developments that it will not have peace with Hizbollah unless it makes peace with Syria.

Hizbollah is today regarded as the only effective organisation in Lebanon. Many are still wondering what prompted a Hizbollah-allied Lebanese MP to call for peace talks with Israel. This led to Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to state last month that it was clear that the war with Hizbollah had left its mark on Lebanon.

The move might not have come from Hizbollah itself but coming as it did from Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement, it is clear that it came from a movement that competes with Hizbollah for the support of Lebanon's Shi'ites.

Over the past several years, Berri has cultivated an alliance with Hizbollah leader Nasrallah with their ties being strengthened further during the recent war in Lebanon.

One might ask why is Hizbollah trying to overthrow or delegitimise the Siniora government? According to an American expert, Joshua Landis, the drawn-out Iraq conflict has fed an image of declining US influence in Lebanon, and this has led Hizbollah to try to weaken, if not overthrow, the Siniora government.

US power in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion enabled it to pry Lebanon away from Syria's sphere of influence, but now as America's authority starts to drain out of the region because of the Iraq debacle, Syria and its allies in Lebanon are trying to capitalise on a weakened America.

This strengthens the argument why a deal will have to be struck with Syria.

When Hizbollah say that they want a government of national unity, in practical terms they are hoping to bring in four Cabinet members belonging to Michel Aoun (whom I met at his residence) and to Hizbollah.

Whether the US is correct in dismissing this as a Syrian-Iranian plot to destabilise Lebanon still has to be seen.

What is clear is that in the wake of the Lebanese war, Nasrallah and his allies want more power in the government.

The outcome of the Hariri trial is important because if it can prove that Syria is complicit in the assassination, then Europe could be forced to go along with sanctions - an American game plan, at least until the recent changes in Congress.

One cannot dismiss lightly the fact that there is mounting pressure, not only by Europeans, but also by some Americans and in the administration, to abandon the policy followed so far and to engage Syria - although President Bush has not given any indication of softening up as yet.

An important point to bear in mind is that Syria could help encourage Hizbollah to make the shift from a military militia to a purely political party in Lebanon. This could even bring security to Israel's northern border.

That is what Syria can offer. But of course that is going to require many things in exchange, which America may not want, or be able, to give. Syria first and foremost wants to reopen negotiations with Israel to regain the Golan Heights. When Ehud Barak was Prime Minister they were very close to an agreement, but the difference was that Syria wanted everything up to the borders of 1967, while Israel wanted to give less than that to ensure their security on their border with Syria.

The point at issue is that Syria do not merely want to resume negotiations but to resume where they left off in 2000.

America indirectly led to the dismemberment of Lebanon because in supporting Israel, it supported a government that destroyed the entire legacy of Hariri which was to rebuild Lebanon - Israel blew up major bridges and all the fancy infrastructure that Hariri had spent the last decade building.

America has been described as having tried to stick its finger in the dike this summer by supporting the Israeli air war to try and destroy Hizbollah and to keep Lebanon securely within the US sphere of influence.

But they failed. And so Syria is back on the march and the Shi'ites and Aoun are reinvigorated.

I think that although the Lebanese hate the Syrians and would not want to turn the clock back they are going to have to make some compromise.

Unless it falls apart, Lebanon has got to find a modus vivendi with Syria.

As a result of the war both the Lebanese and the Israeli governments have been left humiliated and reeling politically.

The American conservative magazine The National Interest has just commented that a major triumph of the Bush administration was to oust Syria from Lebanon while a major failure was to put nothing in its place.

The lesson from this messy scenario is that powerful states, even if perceived as or described as rogues, cannot simply be ignored, particularly if they have sharp claws. Simply ignoring these states is not an option.

One long lesson of the Lebanese war was that perceptions played an important role. Had this not been the case the Palestinian groups, including Hamas, would not have ended up as a mere shadow of their Lebanese heroes (Hizbollah) when it comes to tactical skill.

Leo Brincat, Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs and IT, is the Council of Europe Rapporteur for Lebanon.

leo.brincat@gov.mt