The Middle East
What will prevail: diplomacy or military muscle? King Abdullah II of Jordan criticised Hizbollah when the fighting erupted nearly a month ago, but in an interview with the BBC on Tuesday he was dismissive of American plans for "a new Middle East". The...
What will prevail: diplomacy or military muscle?
King Abdullah II of Jordan criticised Hizbollah when the fighting erupted nearly a month ago, but in an interview with the BBC on Tuesday he was dismissive of American plans for "a new Middle East".
The monarch was reported to have said that he could "no longer read the political map" of the region because of black clouds gathering from Somalia to Lebanon.
The American Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the CSIS, when recently commenting on the Middle East crisis claimed that the US was facing six "long wars" and was still counting.
It had in mind the war in Iraq, the struggle with Iranian proliferation and 'adventures', the war in Afghanistan and the problem of Pakistan, the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, the Israeli-Lebanese struggle, and the broader war on terrorism.
What is worrying indeed is that, almost regardless of the level of violence involved, all of these conflicts now promise to involve religious, ideological, political and perceptual struggles that will play out over at least a decade.
The CSIS argued that the US can lose quickly in some cases but it cannot win quickly in any. Moreover, there are no conflicts where it can act unilaterally.
In every case, success depends on international and local partners.
The biggest dilemma, according to the same think tank, is that although there was never a time when the US needed bipartisan realism and allies more than today, it seems to be heading for growing and largely opportunistic partisanship, uncertain realism at best, and an ongoing compulsion to transform or pressure allies rather than treat them as partners.
If we take the war in Iraq, the US and Iraqi people face a critical period in which Baghdad and the country can slide any time into a level of civil war that US forces can now do little to prevent.
If we then go on to Iran we will find that, beyond the proliferation problem, Iran is gaining significant advantages - as a result of the evolving scenario - in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.
A look at the situation in Afghanistan shows that even though the US may not be losing in Afghanistan, as General Schoomaker said of Iraq, it is not winning. The Afghan government and Afghan forces are not taking hold; they are losing it.
In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, prospects for peace are now even much worse than they were under Arafat with neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis really being peace partners for the other side.
There is no Palestinian unity, and waiting for Hamas, the PIJ and other Palestinian radicals to change is now even less credible than before the fighting started in Lebanon, while Israel is less likely to make meaningful, unilateral withdrawals.
American analyst Anthony H. Cordesman, who is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, feels that in the case of Lebanon you do not need nuclear weapons to attack the US or Israel. The impression in the region being one of an Israel that escalates without being effective and causes needless suffering - a message that well serves Al Qaeda and Hamas, among others.
It was none other than former US President Jimmy Carter who last week made a poignant plea for "breaking the cycle of violence".
He stated that it is inarguable that Israel has a right to defend itself against attacks on its citizens, but it is inhumane and counterproductive to punish civilian populations in the illogical hope that somehow they will blame Hamas and Hizbollah for provoking the devastating response. The result, instead, has been that broad Arab and worldwide support has been rallied for these groups, while condemnation of both Israel and the US has intensified.
To his mind the urgent need in Lebanon is that Israeli attacks stop, that Lebanon's regular military forces control the southern region of the country, that Hizbollah cease as a separate fighting force and future attacks against Israel be prevented. Israel should withdraw from all Lebanese territory, including the Shebaa farms, and release the Lebanese prisoners.
He believes that there will be no substantive and permanent peace for any peoples in this troubled region as long as Israel is violating key UN resolutions, official American policy and the international 'road map' for peace by occupying Arab lands and oppressing the Palestinians.
The original draft of the UN Resolution on Lebanon was stillborn for various reasons, among which:
• the Shebaa farms are referred to as disputed or uncertain areas as opposed to 'occupied';
• it calls for a "cessation of hostilities" until an international force is deployed, as opposed to the "immediate ceasefire" that the Lebanese government has repeatedly demanded;
• it further calls on Hizbollah to cease all 'attacks' while Israel must only cease "offensive military operations". Given that Israel has all along stated that this war is in self-defence this phrasing clearly gives Israel the green light to continue with its attacks;
• it refers to the "unconditional release" of Israeli soldiers but only to "encouraging the efforts aimed at resolving the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel";
• it does not heed Lebanon's demand for an immediate lifting of the Israeli siege of Lebanon. Rather it makes clear that airports and ports will be reopened only for "verifiably and purely civilian purposes";
• there is no mention of an international investigation into Israel's savage attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure as Lebanon's prime minister has repeatedly demanded.
As Israeli PM Fouad Siniora stated last Wednesday "a military solution to Israel's savage war on Lebanon and the Lebanese people is both morally unacceptable and totally unrealistic".
The Hebrew-language media in fact noted that this entirely one-sided document was drafted with close Israeli involvement.
The only thing preventing Israeli officials from jumping up and down with glee, according to Israeli newspaper Haaretz was the fear that "demonstrated Israeli enthusiasm for the draft could influence support among Security Council members who could demand a change in wording that may adversely affect Israel".
Rather than opting for dialogue with Syria - and yes, even Iran - the US seems to be declining contacts with Damascus, even though they have been fruitful in the past on a number of occasions since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Israel might at the end of the day win the battle militarily - although its military planners never anticipated such military resistance in the Lebanon - but in the final analysis the US and Israel will have merely pushed themselves to the diplomatic sidelines.
leo.brincat@gov.mt
Mr Brincat is Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and IT.