Libya's rehabilitation: a model for Iran?

The U.S. Government's decision to remove Libya from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism as well as to establish diplomatic relations with Tripoli is a major development. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was once America's (and Europe's) arch-enemy and had been described by US President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s as the mad dog of the Middle East.

Gaddafi was seen in the West as a major supporter of international terrorism and a major threat to international peace and stability. In the days of the Cold War Gaddafi was clearly an ally of the Soviet Union who was completely opposed to any type of Middle East peace process. His capability to manufacture chemical weapons was also a major concern of the international community.

Now, however, it looks as if Colonel Gaddafi has been rehabilitated in the eyes of Washington and many European countries. His abandonment of his chemical weapons programme and his apparent end of support for international terrorism is clearly very welcome.

There will be some observers, however, who will look at this rapprochement between Libya and the US with some scepticism and suspect that both sides are simply being opportunistic. The Libyan leader, after all, wants to survive and he knows that his largely secular administration is a bulwark against the Islamic fundamentalism that is sweeping across the Arab world, which the West so fears.

On the other hand, it is clear that the US has an interest in Libya's vast oil reserves, so there are certainly major economic interests involved. Furthermore, Colonel Gaddafi has not suddenly turned into a democrat and the US does not seem to be too concerned about this. After all, we never hear President Bush speaking about the need for Libya to undertake political reforms, as he does, for example, when referring to Egypt.

These observations are certainly valid. True, democracy has not sprung up in Tripoli, there are US economic interests in Libya and in today's circumstances it would seem that given a choice between Gaddafi and Islamic fundamentalism (if that is the only choice available) the West would choose Gaddafi. However, the fact that democracy is absent in Libya is no fault of the West. Neither can one argue that opening up to Libya is in any way a sign of support for Gaddafi's regime. It is important to fully engage Libya - this is in everyone's interest - while at the same time urging political reform, if this is at all possible in a country with absolutely no basis for democracy.

The US deal with Libya came after many years of UN sanctions, followed by dialogue and patient diplomacy. As a result of a UN embargo and a ban on US investment, Libya renounced terrorism, gave up its chemical weapons programme, acknowledged responsibility for the Lockerbie atrocity, handed over two agents to be tried over the Lockerbie bombing and agreed on a compensation package for the relatives of the Lockerbie victims.

Clearly, this was a great victory for diplomacy and for the international community speaking with one voice. Some observers say that Colonel Gaddafi was greatly influenced by the invasion of Iraq. I am not too sure about this. It was more a case, I feel, of his wanting to survive. The Libyan leader knew that the West had economic and political interests in Libya and he also knew that diplomacy gave him a way out of his isolation. That is exactly what happened. Colonel Gaddafi shed his past and is now saying that his country is open for foreign investment.

Could this model now be used as a basis for a possible rapprochement between the US and Iran? This situation is of course different. Iran is a regional power which has a lot of clout in the Muslim world and whose leaders are inspired by Islamic fundamentalist beliefs. Furthermore, American-Iranian relations have been put in the deep freeze ever since the overthrow of the Shah and the American embassy hostage drama. So suspicions run very deep between the two sides.

It will not be easy for the Americans to negotiate with Tehran, but it is certainly worth a try. Even though the Iranians' behaviour over their nuclear programme has been unacceptable and the Iranian President's outbursts against Israel are simply outrageous, President Bush is at this stage not correct in refusing to negotiate directly with the Iranians. If the Americans deal directly with Gaddafi, who in the past was their number one hate figure, why don't they try and engage with Tehran?

As I have said many times in this column, a military attack on Iran, let alone an invasion - at least in the near future - would backfire very badly. I don't have to repeat the many risks associated with the military option. In a nutshell, a catastrophe would follow with far-reaching consequences throughout the world. Since it is clear that Iran is still one to five years away from producing a nuclear bomb - according to experts - the Americans need to eat some humble pie and negotiate directly with the Iranians. I am not saying that diplomacy will solve everything, only that it is worth a try.

Washington should first make it clear that it has no intention of bringing about regime change in Iran and it should also acknowledge that Iran does have legitimate security concerns. It has also become evident that confrontation with Iran is in the mullahs' interest and that the issue of nuclear energy has become a focal point which the nation can rally around, not unlike the Anglo-American backed coup which toppled the then nationalist government of Ahmed Mossadegh in 1953.

At this stage the best option would be for the US - as well as the EU - to sit down with the Iranians to discuss a way out of this situation. The threat of UN sanctions must be used as a bargaining chip but a package should be offered to Tehran - one which accepts that all sides have genuine security concerns - and which obviously offers Tehran some major incentives to co-operate. If this was possible with Colonel Gaddafi it just might be also possible with the mullahs, but it won't be easy.