Judge finds statement intolerant but not libellous

Mr Justice Giannino Caruana Demajo, sitting in the First Hall of the Civil Court, yesterday dismissed a libel suit filed by Kenneth Wain against Fondazzjoni Mikiel Anton Vassalli and the foundation's directors and the executive head.

The court found that a press release issued by the foundation did not exceed the limits of the right to freedom of expression and to make a judgment on persons in public life.

The court heard that Prof. Wain had sued Kenneth Busuttil, Desmond Zammit Marmarà, Charles F. Grech, Aleks Farrugia, Frans Darmanin and Marion Scicluna.

Prof. Wain argued that a statement issued to the press in May 2001 by the foundation was libellous in his regard.

The foundation had declared that it was supporting Labour MP Evarist Bartolo and condemning what it described as irresponsible behaviour on the part of Prof. Wain.

The statement had also claimed that Prof. Wain was not collaborating in the sphere of education, but preferred indoctrination and to toe the Nationalist Party's line on the issue of Malta's entry into the European Union.

On its part, the foundation submitted that its statement was a value judgment and was fair comment on a matter of public interest.

Mr Justice Caruana Demajo pointed out that the facts that gave rise to the case took place at a time when there was controversy in the country about EU membership.

Prof. Wain had been of the opinion that Malta should seek entry into the EU, and had participated actively in the campaign in favour of membership.

The foundation believed that as Prof. Wain occupied a public position he should not have participated in this campaign. It had therefore issued its statement condemning Prof. Wain for expressing his views in favour of EU membership.

The court declared that there was no doubt that Prof. Wain was a person of integrity who had an excellent reputation and who was respected by the public and in his professional career. But the foundation and its directors thought he had acted incorrectly by expressing his opinion.

The foundation and its directors were entitled to express their views in public, and when they had stated that Prof. Wain had acted irresponsibly they were making a value judgment.

The law governing libel had to be interpreted in the light of the principle of freedom of expression and defendants in this case had made use of such right.

There could be some doubt as to whether the statement in issue exceeded the limits of freedom of expression, for it had said that Prof. Wain had acted with the intention of causing harm.

The foundation's directors had alleged that Prof. Wain's behaviour was intentionally creating conflicts and was leading to much false and unfair propaganda. Although this part of the statement appeared to exceed fair comment, the court declared that the words had to be assessed in the context of the situation.

Statements, such as the one complained of by Prof. Wain, cast more light on their authors than on those mentioned in them.

The tone of the statement was possibly hysterical and overly aggressive and showed a lack of tolerance, but the court found that it was not libellous.