Constitutional tinkering

There is nothing worse in constitutional legislation than trying to solve ad hoc problems without keeping in view that a written Constitution is a set of rules of enduring effect, which also forms the backbone of a democratic society.

Constitutions cannot be amended on the spur of the moment, or else to ride on a particular sentiment at a given moment in time. Constitutions are written for future generations. They are yardsticks, which should not be easily changed.

That is why every written Constitution has some safeguards about amendments, and the hurdles which a parliamentary majority can bring about such changes.

There seems to be on the drawing board an amendment, which falls into this category of cases, which attempts to take into account a sentiment prevalent in our area, and try to cater for it, as an ad hoc situation has arisen which some feel calls for a change.

Some time ago I wrote that I cannot see why there should be such a problem as part of Gozo has been joined to another constituency in Malta, when we have towns in Malta, traditional ones which are split to accommodate the criteria established by the constitution regarding the size of each constituency.

There is a logic behind such a provision. If there is going to be proportionality, then the constituencies have to be as close as possible. Otherwise a vote in one would count twice as much as in another.

Take the example of the local council elections. A mayor in Mdina is elected with 30-odd votes, while the one in Mgarr needs 255. The vote in Mdina is worth eight times as much. This may be acceptable on a local level, but the scenario is different when it comes to a general election.

May be irrelevant...

For me, the question of Gozo being on its own may be an irrelevant issue if the constitutional amendment does not concentrate on solving only this problem. The margin of difference may not be far in excess of the national average constituency.

The problem lies somewhere else. In 1987, when the amendment on the majority premium was introduced, it was a meagre homage to the principle of proportionality. Within the Labour Party I had raised the question that the prize of a single seat was not sufficient to reflect the principle of relative strength, and that there should be another criterion.

I was shouted down then, and someone interpreted that I was trying to create obstacles so that agreement would not be reached. I never had all the details of a 'package' on which agreement was trying to be forged, but certainly things which resulted later, seem to have been discussed and not concluded. Perhaps the agreement on giving a one-seat majority was not the central point of the discussions.

The majority prize of one seat is not fair. This has been shown when Labour was elected in 1996, when a one-seat majority granted because of the 50% + 1 of the first count votes gave a very precarious majority to Labour, which had to resign within two years.

If we really want to have a fair system, the question of the additional one seat to secure a parliamentary majority to the party polling the majority of votes has to be tackled. Gerrymandering can still be on the agenda of a party in government, which feels that it may be defeated, but at least this should be on a slim majority.

This provision of the Constitution should be amended to safeguard and reflect the true majority in the country. If a party surpasses another with a handful of votes, then it should have an additional seat, as this is what its margin of victory warrants.

If, on the other hand, the margin encompasses more than one national average quota of valid votes cast, then it is not fair to have a one-seat majority to that party. The winning margin should be reflected in the additional seats that should give to the winning party to reflect its actual strength vis-à-vis the opposition party.

The net effect...

The net effect would be that no party in government can be assured of achieving anything by trying to play the dirty games of gerrymandering. And it has to be remembered that, although so many analysts speak of a substantial portion of the electorate as being made up of floating voters, the information that political parties have, gleaned from observation and now more pronounced from local elections, is so substantial that votes can be counted before they are cast.

Then whether Gozo is one constituency or whether Birkirkara should be split up becomes irrelevant nationally, as the total votes give a proportionality in Parliament between Government and opposition, and with the present system of the Single Transferable Vote, there is also a guarantee of true governability.