Court 'violated' man's rights in drugs-related deportation case

The Constitutional Court yesterday upheld an appeal filed by British national Mark Charles Kenneth Stephens from a judgment delivered by the First Hall of the Civil Court last month.

Mr Stephens, who had connections with Malta, had been extradited to Malta from Spain to face charges of conspiring to deal in drugs.

In his constitutional application before the First Hall of the Civil Court, he claimed that his fundamental human rights, as protected by the European Convention of Human Rights, had been violated.

He claimed that following his extradition, he had immediately raised the plea of the lack of jurisdiction of the local courts. However, the Magistrates' Court had declared that his arrest had been regularly carried out.

Mr Stephens had then filed a constitutional case which was decided upon in November 2004. In that case, the court had declared it would not address the issue of jurisdiction, as the matter had to be decided upon by a court of criminal jurisdiction.

According to Mr Stephens, the failure by the Magistrates' Courts, as a court of criminal inquiry, was in violation of his rights to a fair hearing, for such court had to rule not only on factual issues but also on legal issues.

The plea as to the jurisdiction ought therefore to have been decided upon explicitly, but this had not been the case.

Mr Stephens added that the Magistrates' Court had abstained from ruling on this plea on the basis that the powers of the court in that stage were practically limited to the collection of evidence. However, Mr Stephens pointed out that by ruling that he be indicted, the Magistrates' Court had decided upon the issue of jurisdiction in an implicit manner.

He added that his plea as to the jurisdiction coupled with the fact that he had been charged (and might eventually be found guilty) on the basis of facts that were not crimes in terms of Maltese law were connected.

The prosecution had charged Mr Stephens with conspiracy in drug trafficking. This crime, according to law, was of an instantaneous nature, in the sense that agreement alone to commit the crime constituted the crime. However, the prosecution had not declared where the said agreement had taken place, namely whether it was in Spain or in Malta.

In its judgment, the first court declared that Mr Stephens was complaining that he had been deprived of his liberty even though the Magistrates' Court had abstained from deciding upon his plea as to the jurisdiction.

The court declared it was not in agreement with this argument. An individual charged before the courts while under arrest was entitled to contest the validity of the arrest and the decision made by the court.

Such a person was also entitled to request freedom from arrest, while the courts were entitled to rule on such request.

However, Mr Stephens was alleging that once the Magistrates' Court could not decide upon the issue of jurisdiction, then the same court was effectively impeded from deciding upon the legality of his detention.

The first court concluded that if a court was empowered to rule upon the legality of an arrest, it did not have to examine the merits of the case.

Any plea raised by an accused person could lead to the release of such person, but this had to take place after the judicial process was completed.

The court before which a person was arraigned under arrest was to ensure that the arrest was procedurally valid and according to law, and was then to see whether or not it was going to grant release on bail.

The Magistrate's Court, in the inquiry stage, was bound to hear the evidence produced. It was not the role of this court to decide upon guilt or innocence, as this was an issue reserved for courts of criminal jurisdiction before which pleas of a legal nature could be raised.

The fact that decisions of a legal nature were reserved for the second stage of the criminal process was not in violation of the European Convention, the court ruled.

When referring to Mr Stephens' complaint that he had not been released, the court said this was obviously an issue of great importance.

However, once Mr Stephens could contest his continued detention, the fact that the law allowed for the examination of the case at a later stage did not amount to a violation of his fundamental rights.

The investigations carried out by a court before which a person was arraigned under arrest were not into the merits of the case but constituted a judicial review to verify whether the detention was valid or otherwise.

The law provided that such review could take place from time to time.

The court dismissed Mr Stephens' constitutional application and he filed his appeal to the Constitutional Court composed of Chief Justice Vincent Degaetano, Mr Justice Joseph A. Filletti and Mr Justice Anton Depasquale.

Mr Stephens reiterated once more that once the Magistrates' Court, as a court of inquiry, had failed to investigate the issue of his continued arrest, then his fundamental human rights had been violated.

The Constitutional Court declared that the Magistrates' Court, whether as a court of inquiry or as a court of criminal judicature, was bound to examine whether an arrest was justified or otherwise.

This did not mean that the Magistrates' Court had to determine the guilt of the accused, but had to decide whether the continued detention of the accused was justified in the light of the circumstances of the case.

The court added that there were various courts of criminal jurisdiction and they all had different functions.

The Magistrates' Court, as a court of inquiry, could not usurp the functions of the Magistrates' Court as a court of criminal judicature.

Mr Stephens had been charged before the Magistrates' Court, as a court of inquiry, in September 2005 and he had raised the issue of the validity of the arrest warrant issued against him the previous year.

That court had, after hearing the parties, decided that no substantial evidence had been produced to signify that the arrest was unlawful.

Mr Stephens later raised the issue of jurisdiction and had requested the court of inquiry to decide whether there existed the factual basis for a ruling that there were sufficient reasons for a bill of indictment to be issued against him.

Although it was true that the court of inquiry decided issues on a prima facie basis this did not mean that the decision was to be a superficial one.

Mr Stephens had alleged that, in the worst hypothesis, he had associated with persons outside Malta when he himself was away from the country. This was not a crime in terms of Maltese law.

The court of inquiry ought to have decided upon this plea, the Constitutional Court said, within the context of its decision as to whether there were sufficient reasons for a bill of indictment to be issued against Mr Stephens.

However, the court of inquiry had abstained from deciding upon the plea as to the jurisdiction. This lack on the part of the court of inquiry constituted a violation of Mr Stephens' fundamental human right.

The Constitutional Court therefore upheld Mr Stephens' appeal and revoked the judgment of the First Hall of the Civil Court. The Constitutional Court declared that by abstaining from deciding upon Mr Stephens' plea to the jurisdiction, his rights had been violated.

The Attorney General was ordered to pay Mr Stephens Lm400 by way of compensation.

The court further revoked the decree of the court of inquiry delivered in September 2005, which decree had concluded that there were sufficient reasons at law for a bill of indictment to be issued against the accused.

Mr Stephens was put in the same legal position he had prior to that decree, and the court of inquiry was once again to decide whether there were sufficient grounds for a bill of indictment to be issued against him.

Defence counsel Joseph Brincat appeared for Mr Stephens.