Post-EU stillborn politic

Political power in Malta is spread over three layers. On top is the Brussels layer. In the middle layer lies the MP and the lower layer is constituted of the voluntary councillors. Still, notwithstanding this distribution of power, the national government remains the one with the heaviest birthright. Thus, it can also be the most influential on and intrusive in citizens' daily life.

The present rightist government, entrapped within two leftist layers, is proving to be the enfant sauvage of Maltese politics and it often happens that the upper and lower layer have to use their means to check and regulate its behaviour.

By time, LCs have mainly adopted the role of being those that pinpoint local(ity) problems, provide fly-by-night solutions to otherwise long-lasting inconveniences to quell citizens' ill-temper and act as buffer in case of crises.

The Brussels layer's involvement is only triggered in case of acute unethical governmental behaviour and the illegal passing or enforcement of laws.

Statistically, a trend can be traced by looking at general, European Parliament and local council elections over the last few years. The 2003 referendum will also be taken into account. The years covered in this article are those from the creation of the local government system to date, which, coincidentally, also overlap to the immediate pre- and post-EU membership years.

A close study of the results of all such elections shows that EU membership has disturbed the trends in national politics. It has also influenced the 50 per cent +/- PN share which can hardly be taken for granted anymore. With the biggest blow for the PN observed in the EP elections in 2004, these tendencies can also be observed through a study of local election results, which I will discuss separately in another article. Having dedicated its last general election's campaign solely to EU membership, post-EU membership the PN appears as the party that is no longer aiming for absolute majorities but even struggling to keep a 40-year-old 50 per cent +/- tradition.

The trend in general elections has always been of both parties having a 50 per cent +/- share and struggling to get the three to four per cent floating voters on their side. The 1996 election resulted in a 2.91 per cent advantage in favour of the Labour Party. In 1998, the PN won 4.84 per cent votes more than its political opponents and in 2003 it again had a 4.28 per cent advantage. This in terms of first count votes that determine which political party should govern.

However, the PN fared rather badly in its EU referendum campaign. Noteworthy is the fact that the 2003 referendum ended up with the yes camp winning 7.3 per cent of the votes more than the nays. However, the fact that the MLP had urged supporters to vote no, to invalidate the vote or not to vote at all, as well as its reluctance to carry out the traditional active campaign to urge voters' turn-out has to be kept in mind at all times. Indeed, 9.32 per cent of the electorate had not turned out - in spite of the indirect pressure exerted by the no side and the direct pressure by the yes side.

A quick look at past elections shows us that the amount of non-voters since 1992 had never exceeded 4.68 per cent. Indeed, the 1998 election proved to be an exception itself with 4.68 per cent of eligible votes not being cast. In the 1992 election 3.92 per cent of registered voters failed to vote. In 1996 this stood at 3.68 per cent; in 1998 it hit 4.68 per cent and in 2003 those who did not vote represented 3.05 per cent of registered voters.

The 2003 election was exceptional in that it would confirm or otherwise the EU referendum result. Precisely because of the referendum, it was easier for the PN to identify non-voters and work on them systematically over a very short period of time. Having actively and officially campaigned for the election, the PN maximised its potential by addressing problematic voters and, therefore, the electoral campaign in this case could be considered as a rather very long one with the referendum being a sort of a "dry run" or preliminary assessment for the PN.

Another comparative exercise can be made in the case of invalid votes. The percentage of invalid votes in relation to those cast in the 1992 election was 0.8 per cent; 1.7 per cent in 1996; 1.37 per cent in 1998 and 1.02 per cent in 2003.

The number of invalid votes in the 2003 election is noteworthy in the sense that, especially from the MLP's point of view, this was a sort of a second referendum. However, the option of invalidating one's vote was evidently not a popular one as the figure remained stable as that for previous elections.

Some of the invalid votes at the referendum, bearing anti-EU slogans, indicated a preference to the MLP's policy rather than an indifference to politics. This is why it will forever remain a debatable result.

What is relevant is the fact that it would seem that the PN could face real trouble if it takes its traditional affiliates for granted.

The EP election results could be regarded as the first post-EU membership nationwide vote by Maltese voters. The swing towards an MLP-led EU representation was unmistakable. More unmistakable was a non-PN-led representation. Here, the electorate chose once more to gain more control on the government's actions by giving more power to the opposition at another level other than the traditional national parliamentary level.

This fact is even more substantiated by the exceptionally high vote Alternattiva Demokratika attracted. A difference of 8.66 per cent of votes between the MLP and the PN plus a 9.33 per cent vote in favour of AD sent the PN down to 39.76 per cent of votes won (a figure only experienced by the PN in the 1960s).

While the MLP kept the traditional 50 per cent +/- share, the PN plunged while AD shot up to more than nine times its traditional percentage share of voters. Furthermore, AD and an independent extreme-right newcomer won as many or almost as many first count votes as four out of the five PN candidates. This meant that the second MEP candidate elected on behalf of the PN depended totally on the transfer of votes.

Another possible reason for the loss of so many votes for the PN over a period of one year is the fact that in 2003 the electorate voted for the party's message rather than the party. What has been given as reason for the MLP's defeat indeed applies for the PN's ill-gained victory.

In my next article, due on March 2, the local council election results will be analysed. These give an idea of the ongoing support of each of the major parties year by year with AD's humble presence on the wayside. A constant trend however is the fact that the post-EU PN's politic was stillborn and the PN is going through real hard times. Although LC results might be a partial view of support as it stands, the fact alone that the two major parties are taking such elections so seriously, and campaigning to gain dominance to the last minute, throws some light on vote gains and losses in a very concrete and numeric way.