The Depasquale Report - 3

The protest at the Safi immigration centres on January 13, 2005 was organised as a media event. In his report, Judge Franco Depasquale notes that "support from outside may have contributed to stir up the organisers" ("kompla sahhan l-imhuh", p. 25), but does not identify where it came from. The event turned into a violent confrontation because of the determination and aggressiveness of the detainees' ringleaders; but our armed forces did not come out with flying colours either.

The previous October a spontaneous protest ended peacefully after the army's show of force (p. 20). Late on January 12, national group leaders informed detainees about a public protest for the next day, when they would surprise their guards and escape from their compounds. They reassured doubters by recalling that nobody had been harmed the previous October (p. 20). They painted slogans during the night, but preparations had begun "at least three days before" (p. 65). The choice of the date has never been explained, but there is an uncanny coincidence with the arrival two days before of the UNHCR representative, whose visit would have been planned in advance.

The Depasquale report refers to "the suspicion that even persons outside the compound knew about the idea" (p. 20) and says that "it might well be that others besides the immigrants knew about the protest and that some journalists might have had advance notice of it" (p. 24). This is understandable, as every organiser of a media event informs the press beforehand. However, it is unlikely that the detainees could have been directly in contact with the press. In any case, this event was definitely newsworthy because few Maltese, including photographers and cameramen, had ever witnessed the sight of mostly oversize Africans engaging Maltese soldiers in full riot gear.

As the protest started, a cameraman arrived and filmed the scene. He came back later with more journalists (p. 24). After five minutes, journalists were authorised to speak to the protesters: "the Brigadier testified that he found no objection to the journalists' speaking to them" (p. 23). One journalist approached. He spoke to the protesters for half an hour and withdrew on being told he would stay only at his own risk (p. 24). The report quotes a detainee as saying: "At this moment we told the journalist ... 'they are coming to beat us'; he told us that was impossible because there were many journalists" (p. 41).

Patient negotiations

The judge makes it clear that "the protest was neither peaceful nor legitimate" (p. 67), but for more than two hours the army negotiated patiently with the protesters to persuade them to return to their compounds (pp. 28-29). However "a small number of detainees were in control of the situation and were determined not to go back" (p. 29). They "did not allow any of their companions to move ... and threatened them that if they returned they would pay them back" (p. 33).

The judge notes that "the detainees in the adjacent compound had started throwing stones and, had they decided to break out too, there would have not been enough soldiers to control the situation in both places". He, therefore, concludes that "the Brigadier was justified to order the activation of the plan to put an end to the detainees' escape and put them back in the compound by the use of force" (p. 39).

Even at this late hour, army officers continued trying, in vain, to persuade the detainees to go in (p. 40). However, the plan to snatch a few of the ringleaders failed partly because of "lack of information and co-ordination" (p. 36). A soldier described the situation as "a boat with nine captains" (p. 40); "the soldiers on both sides were in a state of uncertainty and disorder" (p. 38). An officer testified that "as soon as the snatch teams ran towards the detainees sitting on the ground, the latter stood up and rushed on the soldiers; they succeeded in splitting us and we ended up as little pockets of arrest teams" (p. 44). A free-for-all ensued with stones, pointed sticks, batons, fists and feet (pp. 45-52). But "it has been proved that almost no one of the ringleaders was seriously harmed during the incidents; the calmer ones were the ones who suffered most" (p. 81).

The Depasquale report's references to the army's amateurishness and lack of professionalism (p. 55) are well deserved. There was a history of fraternisation among soldiers and detainees, and lack of training by the soldiers. Some soldiers played football with the detainees (p. 82).

Another said that he discussed "family, culture and religion" with them (p. 14). "Friends could come and hand the detainees anything from outside without any hindrance whatsoever" (p. 10) and "the soldiers would not have known if a friend of theirs decided to pass them some firearm" (p. 81). Other soldiers ran errands, going to Valletta to collect money for the detainees (p. 11). As the report says, "without adequate discipline, these centres cannot be well run and serve only as a bomb ready to explode" (p. 82).

Discipline and training

The soldiers could not enforce order. "They admitted they were not in a position to force detainees to move from one camp to another because they are afraid of some violent reaction" (p. 10). The judge found the retaining fence open or torn and asked the soldiers "why it could not be repaired for greater security; they replied that they did not dare touch it as they were sure the immigrants would protest with violence and would not let them do this work" (p. 31). "There were many cases when detainees refused their food and even threw it in the face of the soldiers who brought it, or broke everything in the compound including the television sets, or insulted the soldiers, and spat and threw dirt in their faces" (p. 13).

The 30-strong internal security platoon "had once spent about half-a-day training with the soldiers, but this could not be continued because of difficulties to bring them all together". One person testified that when the soldiers were called, "some were on sick leave, others were with the band at some concert, and maybe one would be needed in the garage to replace missing persons; as a result they have practically no training". He added that the officer originally in charge "had just been back from abroad and had many ideas, but after a while was discouraged; because of one thing and another, the projects he had in mind came to nothing" (p. 27).

Judge Depasquale opines that "the fact that the soldiers, except for one company of the First Regiment, were not prepared for the action they were entrusted with was a determining factor in the failed execution of the action plan" (p. 26). Perhaps the most significant proof of failure was the fact that the Brigadier himself was drawn into hand-to-hand combat with detainees during the free-for-all.

He testified: "I identify myself fighting with a detainee who was bigger than me in stature ... When I saw him approaching me, I told him to stop but he came towards me and waved his hand, but I succeeded in avoiding the blow, I tripped him and he fell to the ground ... Some time later another who was smaller in build ... also ran towards me, but I could hold him from his chest and I pushed him to the ground" (p. 52). The Brigadier's physical prowess is no doubt admirable, but one can wonder which army worth its salt allows its commander to be personally attacked by a rioter. What is obviously needed is more discipline, not more money.

The Depasquale report deals also with the role of NGOs. It praises their honesty and commitment to helping immigrants in need (pp. 58-60, 82-83, 87-88) and recommends that they be given a more important role (p. 88).

However, their activities sometimes lack transparency. Some of their enthusiastic acts "are unfortunately not always of real help to the immigrants" (p. 88). In addition, in the days following the incidents, some NGOs interviewed many detainees. The judge expressed the wish to have a copy of the record of these interviews. "The NGOs told him they would give him the records but, till the very eve of the report's submission, they had not done so, claiming they could not find them" (p. 4).

No commentary can do justice to the Depasquale report. Those who are interested in the problem of illegal immigration in Malta have to take the time to read it in full. It is the only study so far which tackles the problem from the legal, economic, social and international aspects. It would be a pity if the authorities were not to tap further the knowledge and expertise that Judge Depasquale has accumulated during a whole year's examination of this increasingly hot subject.

Concluded