The Depasquale Report - 2

Judge Franco Depasquale's report on the January 2005 incidents at the Safi detention centre and ancillary questions shows that Malta has been badly served by its two closest neighbours on the issue of illegal immigration.

Libya keeps its southern borders wide open to immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, knowing they intend to move on to a better future in Europe. At the same time it does not properly police its long Mediterranean shore and so facilitates their departure. Italy, their main destination, has followed an inconsistent policy.

The Depasquale report shows how Malta has been squeezed in the middle. Italy's control of its seashore has been sporadic, as has been its policy of sending immigrants back to Libya or to their country of origin.

At the same time it has insisted that Malta accept the obligation to take back immigrants leaving from our shores. However, Libya has not yet accepted to take back immigrants arriving in Malta from that country. Italy has also been a bit too ready to direct to Malta seacraft that are not always in distress and not always clearly within Malta's Search and Rescue Region.

The report confirms: "All the detainees who testified admitted they had been upset at arriving in Malta as they wanted and had paid to go to Italy. There is no doubt that all immigrants know where they would like to go. Not only do they mention Italy or Germany; they also know where they would like to settle and who is waiting for them. Italy's northern frontiers are easy to cross; ...70 per cent of the thousands of immigrants arriving in Italy leave within a year and probably join their relatives in other countries" (p. 77).

This may be the reason behind Italy's leniency towards the immigrants. A soldier quoted immigrants as saying that "one of them nicknamed Napoleon had escaped and telephoned them from Sicily. He told them Sicily was better because after a few days they give them a mobile phone and the process is very much shorter than in Malta" (pp. 78-79).

On the other hand, those without friends or relatives in continental Europe often change their mind and wish to stay in Malta. The report notes that one immigrant, asked "What do you intend to do when you are no longer in detention?" replied without hesitation: "I will go out and look for a job".

Another immigrant, asked about the purpose of the January protest, replied: "We want to protest because we want to stay in Malta with the other Maltese" (pp.15-16).

This explains the general Maltese attitude towards immigrants. The report says: "If the Maltese people knew that these foreigners came to Malta for a short time only, they would certainly welcome them according to their secular tradition... but there is a fear that immigrants come to settle in Malta and even bring over their often large families. Similar reactions... emerged before Malta joined the European Union. The fear of a potentially large inflow of Sicilians who would take our jobs was the issue causing perhaps the greatest concern" (p. 16).

The Depasquale report amply proves that the demonstration of January 2005 was motivated by the immigrants' wish to go to continental Europe or work in Malta, and hence fulfil their ambition of settling, working and sending money back home. They did not protest against their living conditions. Their material complaints included "some broken window pane... leaking drains... always the same food" (p. 12).

But they had "for a long time refused to move from old and torn tents to new ones" (p. 9), offering to move only "as a bargaining chip in exchange of a reduction of their period of detention" (p. 71). On one occasion they "threatened to go on a hunger strike because the army did not have enough toothpaste for all of them" (p. 10). The report concludes that these "were not important factors leading to the events at Safi barracks" (p. 16).

A major conclusion of the Depasquale report is that the vast majority of immigrants in Malta seek better economic standards. Only a small minority qualify as asylum-seekers. Therefore, the emphasis on the refugee aspect of the problem and the involvement of the UNHCR seem somewhat overstated.

UNHCR official's visit

The United Nations is an organisation of sovereign states represented by their governments. It has specialised agencies. The office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, known by its acronym UNHCR, deals with refugees. Staff members of the United Nations system are international civil servants. They are bound to maintain a certain degree of decorum and impartiality and cannot militate for or against a cause they work for. However, their attitude varies with the country they deal with. They usually maintain a high degree of professional ethics in their relations with big countries. They tend to be more relaxed in the case of small countries, or failed or collapsed states, sometimes behaving like former colonial civil servants.

In his report, Judge Depasquale refers to the role of Dr Michele Manca de Nissa, a UNHCR officer who, by accident or design, arrived in Malta two days before the events of January 13, 2005. Immigrants knew of his presence; during the incidents they called "Manca, Manca" (p. 24). The latter was aware of the events.

Mgr Philip Calleja drove him to Safi. The soldiers on duty allowed Mgr Calleja in, but "did not feel they could let in Dr Manca de Nissa in such a delicate moment" (p. 87). Dr Manca de Nissa returned to the detention centres the day after and spoke to the immigrants. Maltese Refugees Commissioner Charles Buttigieg testified:

"Dr de Nissa spoke to them as well. He told them more than once that UNHCR did not agree with the detention system and the latter should be done away with or shortened. He also told them that Malta would have to abide by the conditions of the European Union directive on minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers.

"He told them that this should become part of Maltese law by February 6, 2005. He told them that UNHCR did not agree with the detention period of 18 months and that he considered this period as too long. He also told them that UNHCR had been protesting for a long time with the Maltese authorities about this detention policy, its length and the unacceptable conditions in which they were living" (p. 79).

Mr Buttigieg adds: "I was surprised that in such a delicate moment Dr de Nissa felt he could make such a speech." He is further quoted as saying: "Even in B Block, we stayed about an hour and a half with the representatives of the immigrants. Dr de Nissa confirmed to them too that UNHCR thought it would be better if the detention policy were abolished completely, but it could not tell Malta what to do because Malta is a sovereign country. He also told them that if Malta did not abolish the detention policy it should at least lower it to a maximum of six months; more than six months was unreasonable" (p. 79).

Judge Depasquale says euphemistically that Dr Manca de Nissa's words were unhelpful. In addition, he reports on three occasions (pp. 63, 66 and 70) that Dr Manca de Nissa gave a press conference. Only much more senior UNHCR officers are authorised to speak to the press. It goes without saying that in a bigger country Dr de Nissa would have spoken more carefully and more respectfully; otherwise he would have been called to order by his superiors.

In addition, Judge Depasquale reports that the UNHCR Website carried photos and the following comment: "Graphic pictures of soldiers in full riot gear kicking protesters and bludgeoning them with batons were shown on Maltese television and published in newspapers, triggering an unprecedented debate about the incident itself and Malta's detention policy."

The judge comments that, on the basis of testimony of the victim himself, the protester shown in the photo did not mention receiving any blows to the doctors who examined him in hospital. He adds: "The same report says that a protester had required 15 stitches and a third had three broken bones in his leg. Neither the records nor the testimony indicate that any protester had required so many stitches or had similar injuries" (p. 90). It is, therefore, obvious that UNHCR, through its Website, published untrue 'facts' and showed a sensational picture while attributing responsibility vaguely to Maltese television and newspapers. It should perhaps have been more respectful of Malta as a member state of the United Nations.

The clear conclusion of the Depasquale report is that the events at Safi in January 2005 were intended as a peaceful demonstration to impress public opinion through the media and the intervention of the armed forces was intended as a show of force to persuade the demonstrators to go back to their centres. But several things went wrong.

(To be concluded)