Husband's eviction applies to wife too, court rules

The Court of Appeal has confirmed a judgment of the First Hall of the Civil Court finding that a wife is affected by an eviction order issued against a husband as the payment of rent falls under the ordinary administration of the community of acquests.

Alfred and Alice Brown had filed their writ of summons in the First Hall of the Civil Court against John Mifsud.

They claimed that they rented premises in Guardamangia from Mr Mifsud which was used as their matrimonial home.

Mr Mifsud had filed an application against Mr Brown at the Rent Regulation Board, and in November 2000 the board had ordered Mr Brown to vacate the premises within three months.

Although Mrs Brown was a tenant of the premises, as the rent had been entered into during her marriage to Mr Brown, she had not been included in the application filed by Mr Mifsud.

The Browns therefore requested the First Hall of the Civil Court to declare that the wife was also a tenant of the premises and to find that the eviction order obtained by Mr Brown could not take effect in respect of the wife.

The First Hall of the Civil Court had ruled that the lease entered into between Mr Mifsud and Mr Brown was not an act of extraordinary administration of the community of acquests existing between the spouses, and that therefore the wife's consent was not required.

In its judgment, the first court found that it resulted from the evidence that the Browns had entered into the lease with Mr Mifsud during their marriage and that there was therefore no doubt that the lease formed part of the community of acquests existing between the Browns.

Mr Mifsud had obtained a judgment from the board whereby Mr Brown was ordered to vacate the premises, and Mr Brown had not appealed from this judgment.

The court added that prior to the amendments introduced in 1993, the legal and juridical representation of the community of acquests was vested in the husband, who could administer this alone.

In 1993, the situation changed and the administration of the community of acquests was vested in both spouses.

The law distinguished between acts of ordinary administration and acts of extraordinary administration. The latter had to be undertaken by both spouses together.

The law itself listed actions which were to be considered as extraordinary administration of the community of acquests, and case law had interpreted this list as being exhaustive.

The payment of rent of property forming part of the community of acquests and actions for the eviction of tenants from such property were not included in the list established at law.

Once these were items of ordinary administration, then these could be undertaken by either of the married couple. The first court declared that once the case before the board was in connection with an act of ordinary administration, the proceedings instituted against the husband affected not only the community of acquests but also the wife.

Mr and Mrs Brown appealed from this judgment to the Court of Appeal composed of Chief Justice Vincent Degaetano, Mr Justice Anton Depasquale and Mr Justice Albert J. Magri.

The court declared that it found nothing to criticise in the manner in which the first court had decided upon the case filed by the Browns.

Furthermore, the appellate court confirmed the decision of the first court which had ruled that it could not declare that Mrs Brown participated in the lease of the premises, for although she had had such rights, these had terminated when the board had delivered its judgment and terminated the lease.

The Court therefore revoked the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the first court.