Appeal Court rules spinster's will stands

The Court of Appeal confirmed a judgment of the Gozo court which had dismissed a request for the annulment of a will.

Joseph Galea, Carmen Camilleri, Lucy Portelli and Anthony Galea, brothers and sisters, had filed a writ in the Gozo court against their sister Maria Camilleri.

Plaintiffs claimed that a will made by their cousin, Rose Cauchi, in October 1985 was null and void as it was the result of fraud carried out by Maria Camilleri.

Defendant denied the claim and her pleas were upheld by the Gozo court.

Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeal composed of Chief Justice Vincent Degaetano, Mr Justice Joseph D. Camilleri and Mr Justice Joseph A. Filletti.

The court heard that Ms Cauchi was an old spinster who lived in Nadur. As her brother Toni predeceased her, Ms Cauchi lived on her own. She was almost 80 years old, was bedridden and almost blind.

She had entered into an arrangement with plaintiff Joseph Galea and Maria Camilleri so that they would look after her in turns.

By way of compensation, Ms Cauchi had drawn up a will in April 1983 and had appointed all the Galea siblings as her heirs.

In October 1985, Ms Cauchi left her house and was nursed at St Dominic's Clinic, Victoria where she died a week later.

In the few days of her stay at the clinic, Ms Cauchi drew up another will which plaintiffs were trying to annul.

The Court of Appeal added that plaintiffs' appeal was principally on the interpretation of the evidence by the Gozo court in first instance.

Plaintiffs alleged that Ms Cauchi was not capable of drawing up her will due to mental infirmity that was the result of the tranquillisers administered to her in the clinic.

The Gozo court had pointed out that mental infirmity or incapacity and fraud were not compatible grounds.

Either Ms Cauchi was capable of drawing up her will but was the subject of fraud so as to favour one of her heirs over the others or she was not capable of making a will due to mental infirmity.

Ms Camilleri had submitted to the Court of Appeal that the appeal had to be limited to plaintiffs' original demands in their writ of summons, namely that the will was null due to fraud and not to mental incapacity.

The Court of Appeal pointed out that Ms Camilleri's submission had been adopted by the first court which had correctly stated it was not going to examine the ground of mental infirmity but was going to limit itself to an examination of the alleged fraud.

In its judgment, the Court of Appeal declared it did not lightly disturb the evaluation of evidence by an inferior court unless there were serious reasons for so doing. In this case the versions of the parties were diametrically opposed.

However, conflicting evidence was a regular event and the court had to examine which of the two versions was more credible than the other.

Conflict in evidence favoured the defendant, as it was up to plaintiffs to prove their allegations and the courts had to reach their conclusions on the basis of moral certainty in civil cases.

The appellate court added that there were a number of legal principles that had to be taken into consideration in this case.

The first principle was that wills were to be presumed to be valid and could only be annulled on serious grounds.

The allegation of fraud had to be substantiated and plaintiffs had to prove that the fraud was such that the testator would otherwise not have drawn up the testamentary dispositions complained of.

The simple fact of a testator drawing up a will to comply with the wishes of another party was not enough to reach the conclusion that the will was the result of fraud.

Furthermore, the presumption at law was that every person was capable of drawing up a will and that there was no legal requirement of perfect mental health but only that of sufficient perception.

Evidence of mental incapacity had to be produced by the person alleging such incapacity. The evidence had to be such as to prove that the testator did not have knowledge nor will.

The reasonableness of the testamentary dispositions was another determining factor.

The Court of Appeal noted in its judgment that the notary who had drawn up the will had ascertained that the will reflected Ms Cauchi's wishes.

After examining all the evidence produced, the Court of Appeal concluded that the first court's decision was correct for plaintiffs had not proven to the degree required by law that the will was the result of fraud exercised on Ms Cauchi.