Euro-US relations: will there be any substantial changes?

The best way to assess the prospects of substantive changes in Euro-US relations in the wake of President Bush's recent visit to Europe is to adopt a 'wait and see' approach and allow the passage of time to leave its indelible mark on the whole process of transatlantic relations.

A few days before Bush flew to Europe two important papers were written on the subject trying to anticipate (and possibly influence) the shape of things to come.

The first was an article published on the Websites of the Brookings Institution and the Centre for European Reform whereby 55 distinguished personalities, ranging from Strobe Talbott to Francis Fukuyama and from Timothy Garton Ash to former British foreign minister Douglas Hurd, set out their objectives in what was called "The Compact between the United States and Europe".

It was basically a concrete strategy for mending fences between the two sides while tracing telegraphically the way they had grown apart in recent years.

The other was a commentary on "Bush II and Europe" drawn up by Fraser Cameron for the Brussels-based think tank, the European Policy Centre.

As a point of departure these papers based themselves on the conventional wisdom that the US and Europe had grown apart, and that the end of the cold war and 9/11 had produced a strategic divergence that was virtually impossible to overcome.

There were at least six issues of divergence, which could not be papered over that easily.

These were, primarily, tensions over Iraq, Iran, Israel, the environment and other issues.

What I found interesting about this Compact is that apart from not demonstrating that trans-Atlantic differences do not exist nor that agreement is easy, it showed that agreement on a comprehensive transatlantic strategy was possible.

In fact the way it was drafted formed the basis of a would-be diplomatic agreement between both sides, that offered specific policy recommendations for dealing with most of the key strategic challenges of the day.

Those who signed the Compact believe that the transatlantic partnership must endure not because of what it has achieved in the past, but because 'our common future' also depends on it.

It is useless kidding ourselves. The transatlantic divide was not born out of misperceptions or misunderstandings. Neither was it the result of poor communications. "It arose because each side took actions the other strongly opposed, or declined to join in actions the other strongly favoured."

When disputes between Europe and the US did emerge they became self-perpetuating in the sense that American policies sparked hostility among Europeans and vice-versa.

What offered much hope to President Bush's European visit was that both sides seemed to be proclaiming their desire for better relations.

What we need to find out is whether beyond the rhetoric this partnership will now evolve into a productive one.

For this to happen each side will have to take steps that address the legitimate concerns of the other.

While Europe was prepared to welcome a change in American rhetoric it also wanted to see a change in policy in areas of key importance, such as the Middle East, climate change and support for more effective multilateral institutions.

Throughout this process one cannot completely ignore the power of US interest groups.

Although new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has limited experience of the EU, I must admit that she played her cards very well with European audiences and leaders.

She now has an added advantage in that in Bob Zoellick, her deputy, she has someone who knows Europe better than anyone else in the Republican Party.

For once here is someone in the US administration who not only had a good working relationship with such eminent persons as former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy but who also has a healthy respect for the EU's "soft power".

The departure of such neocons and critics of Europe as John Bolton at the State Department and Douglas Feith at the Pentagon will not be regretted in Europe.

The more the US comes forward with pragmatists who have some experience of Europe, the deeper could be the understanding between both sides.

What time will tell is whether Bush will stick to his guns, particularly given that he had fought the election primarily on his foreign policy record and was thus likely to regard his victory as justification for his policies.

With things beginning to move on the Israeli-Palestinian front I feel that this is the real foreign policy litmus test between both sides. What we need to see is whether, given a successful Israeli pullout from Gaza, the US will press hard enough for Israeli evacuation from most of the West Bank.

The US cannot afford to take a back seat in this process by merely relegating itself to a facilitator. If the US is perceived as not making a full effort on the Arab-Israeli dispute, it will have further negative consequences on transatlantic relations and its image in the so-called greater Middle East.

While the initial US reaction to Iran following Bush's European visit was to show a certain willingness to support the Europeans' diplomatic efforts to persuade Teheran of the wisdom of going down the non-nuclear path, some members of the US administration are already convinced that these efforts will fail, and that sticks rather than carrots will be required.

If Iraq brought about a split between Europeans and Americans, any US military strike on Iran would have the most severe consequences for transatlantic relations.

As Europeans we expect and demand to see tangible progress on the International Criminal Court issue. The ICC should be the best way for the international community to deal with genocide while there cannot be one law for the most powerful nation in the world and another for everyone else.

On China one suggestion made by the Compact was that the EU should declare that if it lifts its arms embargo, it will replace it with a reinforced code of conduct on arms sales.

While Russia had benefited from Bush's preoccupation with the war on terror, it does not seem that there was a completely icy stand-up to Putin's attitude towards his weaker neighbours, even though the US seemed to have been prepared to allow the EU to take the lead in supporting a democratic transition in such countries as Ukraine.

What I expect to see in the coming days is an engagement between Europe and the US to analyse in detail the feasibility of the recommendations of the Kofi Annan High-Level Panel report on UN reform.

Without sounding overoptimistic I tend to agree that in summary the Bush visit did signal a new spirit of co-operation, even if one looked beyond the gestures and the rhetoric. But several divisive issues remained and it was too early to predict whether these steps could lead to a genuine EU-US partnership.

It might be of some consolation that, apart from the constructive approach Bush adopted to certain issues, there was also a marked change in tone that seemed to run through his European visit. On the other hand, I cannot agree with those analysts who noted a "dramatic" change in diplomatic style in these early months of the second Bush administration.

Many are of the opinion that by the summer one would be able to conclude whether or not a leaf had been turned and the gap between the US and Europe effectively narrowed.

As new crises emerge we still need to see whether Europe and the US will share a similar view with regard to imminent threats and global priorities.

Guillaume Parmentier recently made the interesting point that while Europeans believed a new era in international politics had begun with the fall of the Berlin Wall, for the Americans this era had only been rung in on September 11, 2001.

These changes in Euro-American relations had been in the pipeline for some time but anyone expecting a transatlantic love-in will ultimately be disappointed.

While previously US Presidents, Bush in particular, played down references to Europe's importance - particularly the EU - this time round Bush spoke of a united and strong Europe being preferable to a disaggregated one.

I believe that the US should find much common ground in the European Security Strategy, particularly when it comes to the need to curb terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

In conclusion I feel that while all of this was useful, one should not be overly confident. Still, the visit provided enough substance for one to build on progressively.

Particularly after its enlargement, the EU needs to engage in a strategic dialogue with the US on an ongoing basis. One can safely say that we will be able to consider ourselves to have finally got there once the relationship between Europe and the US will have evolved into a "partnership of equals".

leo.brincat@gov.mt.

Leo Brincat is the main Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs and IT.