As expected, the four-way talks between Greece, Turkey, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, with the direct participation of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, ended in complete failure.
As previously agreed, Mr Annan filled in the missing parts over which there was no tacit agreement. The Annan Plan for Cyprus version 3 will now go to the two ethnic communities in Cyprus for approval in a referendum on April 24.
The Turks appear visibly happy with the outcome, though it is less than certain whether the Turkish Cypriots will eventually approve the plan.
The Greek Cypriots seem to be burning at both ends. The vast majority of them (according to opinion polls) are inclined to reject the plan, and unless there is a radical turn of events will vote against it.
That will mean that the plan will be null and void. But it also implies that the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will have the opportunity, finally, to win international recognition.
The Turkish government has already warned the Greek Cypriots that that is what Ankara will do its utmost to attain if they reject the plan.
If the Greek Cypriots reject the plan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be kept out of the EU for the time being. But the EU will find it harder to resist giving them the concessions they want to export freely to the EU, not to mention the much-longed-for but denied recognition.
That is however hard to contemplate with Cyprus now in the EU. On the other hand Nicosia will now have to weigh carefully the implications of an obstructionist policy towards Turkey and the TRNC within the EU and whether it looks forward to its new life in Europe, isolated from the rest of the 25 member states.
As for Turkey, it had better not overplay its hands either. If the current perception that the Greek Cypriots were bullied into a corner gains more credence, the small EU member states still have enough time to ponder Turkey's EU membership prospects before the decision is taken by the EU in December.
So Ankara needs to cool down a little and ensure that between now and April 24 it does its utmost to pacify the Greek Cypriots on the main points that are irking them. And people are going to be watchful on any backsliding on the final deal on Cyprus, particularly on the part of Turkey.
It must not be forgotten that fairness within the realms of available possibilities is what most people in the EU want of Cyprus. And, lest it be overlooked, Cyprus is a fellow member state towards which the other member states have a contractual obligation of solidarity.
Realpolitik considerations of course often dispense with such normative considerations, a lesson that the Greek Cypriots have just tasted with great disdain. Indeed, years of near unanimous international declarations condemning Turkey's partition of the island seem now to have been obliterated. Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots seem to have been partially gratified for their defiance.
But when all is said, one hopes that common sense eventually triumphs on all sides and that no effort is spared in making it easier for all communities to accept a solution to the problem.
The EU and the UN also need to ponder carefully on the next steps. They must not harbour any illusions that if the plan is forced on the Cypriot communities then "the deed is done", as Alvaro de Soto, the UN Secretary General's Adviser on Cyprus, was reported to have claimed at the end of the Bürgenstock talks.
As for the Greek Cypriots, their leaders have to weigh the alternatives carefully. The Annan Plan as it stands offers some certainties, even if it short changes them on some issues. On the other hand, the future in the aftermath of a rejection of the plan is just a gamble.
When Cyprus was invaded and partitioned in 1974 and wholesale population movements took place in both directions as the Cypriots were resettled on both sides of the divide, it became almost certain that things could never be returned to their pristine conditions.
Thirty years of Turkish-Cypriot obstructionism to a negotiated solution have naturally taken their toil. If we take property as just one example, a return to the pre-1974 situation cannot be achieved without committing more injustices in the name of justice.
The Annan Plan as it stands now provides for some territorial concessions to the Greek Cypriots. A majority of the displaced and disposed persons will be able to return to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration. The rest will have their property rights fully honoured by reinstatement and/or compensation.
Many questions remain to be answered: will this scheme operate efficiently? Will international donors deliver? Will the federal government of the Cypriot state operate well? How can this be guaranteed if Cyprus does not have a federal culture? Will the cost of unification cripple the Cypriot economy?
Some Greek Cypriots have taken issue with the EU on the fact that some derogations from EU law, the acquis communautaire will have to be applied to facilitate the operation of the Annan Plan. But that really is not an objection that will stand scrutiny.
Derogations, permanent or temporary, are the norm when the EU wishes to shield regions and communities from the detrimental effects of EU laws that are unworkable in their respect. In its membership negotiations Malta secured some 72 of these caveats and Cyprus secured some as well.
Lest Greek Cypriots wish to be hoisted by their own petard, they need to downplay this objection. The choice before them seems to be one: they have an agreement that is less than what they expected but which is not a complete non-starter.
The choice lies between this and more uncertainty that ensues from rejecting it. Uncertainty will not enhance the Greek Cypriots' ability to determine outcomes and they may eventually also be constrained to settle for much less, not more.
Uncertainty is also likely to produce negative economic repercussions - which has a price tag. It appears that when the current Greek Cypriot President rejected the Annan Plan, when he was still in opposition, little thought was spared to construct a fallback position or alternative scenarios.
Greek Cypriots have for long been nourished on a diet of the justice of their claims but never have they been told that a final solution may require them to pay something in return.
EU membership was rightly depicted as a stimulant to a solution to the Cyprus Problem. But then they ran away with the thought that the solution will be purely on their terms.
At the talks which began last February, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash did his best to advance the Turkish cause by being himself: simply obstructionist. The Greek Cypriots appear to have been unable to extricate themselves from this trap.
Mr Annan was thus left to fill in more blanks than the Greek Cypriots should have allowed him to. But what's done is done. What matters is what turns the two communities in Cyprus take from here on.
The advantages to the Greek Cypriots from rejecting the plan are less than pretty obvious.