Pilots cleared of criminal responsibility

A magisterial inquiry into the ground collision of an Air Malta Airbus with an electricity pylon has exonerated the pilots from any criminal responsibility and concluded that the accident was due to the inadequate facilities on Apron 2, where the accident took place, coupled with a number of shortcomings.

Magistrate Giovanni Grixti, who conducted the inquiry, ordered the Director General of Civil Aviation to prohibit with immediate effect aircraft activity from Apron 2 for aircraft falling within specified categories (C, D, E and F as classified in the Aerodrome Reference Code Annex) unless under tow, without passengers and assisted by more than one marshaller until the apron was fit for such activities, sources said.

On January 19 Flight KM642, scheduled for Catania, was aborted when the aircraft hit an electricity pylon with its right wing while taxiing on Apron 2. The pylon was bent and came to rest on the aircraft's fuselage. As a result of the collision there was a fuel leakage but luckily none of the 27 passengers and six crew suffered any injuries although the aircraft and the pylon were extensively damaged.

The inquiry's procès verbal includes the description of the accident as experienced by passengers and crew members who explained that they heard a loud noise followed by a louder one seconds later and strong vibrations caused by the pylon coming to rest on the aircraft's fuselage. The vibrations caused some head bins in the aircraft to burst open and objects to fall out of them. One passenger described the time between the collision and leaving the aircraft as "five interminable minutes of fear".

In the inquiry's procès verbal, Magistrate Grixti, an expert in aviation law and holder of a UK JAA pilot's licence, noted that the incident took place when the Airbus turned left during taxiing in order to leave Apron 2. The magistrate noted that although Apron 2 was used for general aviation and business jets, it was not marked with the taxi lines necessary for the safe transit of aircraft on the ground. This, he noted, was undoubtedly one of the major contributing factors to the accident.

During the manoeuvre the aircraft had to pass between a Malta Air Charter helicopter on its right and Hangar 3 on its left. Once it passed through it was to make a second turn onto the runway. But instead of moving on straight after the left turn, the aircraft moved towards the left, coming dangerously close to the building that formed part of Hangar 3. The aircraft did not hit the building because it hit the pylon with the right wing and before the aircraft could stop the pylon collapsed until it came to rest on the jet's fuselage.

It resulted that in executing the left turn the cockpit crew had visually apportioned the difference between the helicopter tail rotor and the hangar. In fact the plane was steered some 10 metres away from the rotors and about eight meters away from the hangar.

The problem was that only the metal structure that formed part of the hangar was visible to the crew from the cockpit. The stone building that also formed part of the hangar and protruded some seven metres, and the pylon, were not visible to them.

With the wrong plan in mind and at hand the captain steered towards the left thinking there was enough space but hit the pylon with the plane's right wing.

The magistrate noted that it was worrying that although Hangar 3 was marked on the Malta International Airport charts, the lower part of the building (that was not visible from the cockpit) was not marked as it was for Hangar 2. Moreover, although the lighting masts provided light onto the apron they themselves had nothing to show their presence and were not marked on the charts used by pilots to manoeuvre in the area. The magistrate cited a 1994 incident at Gatwick Airport, which laid importance on the use of lights and adequate information on airports and taxiways.

A reconstruction of the events revealed that the two pilots, who were both properly licensed and qualified, were not to be held responsible for the collision. The collision had been caused due to the inadequate facilities on Apron 2 coupled with a number of shortcomings, including lack of information on official charts, lack of necessary apron markings and lighting.

The procès verbal also contained a list of shortcomings which needed to be seen to, to avoid similar accidents in the future, especially when one took into consideration the fact that the accident took place metres away from the bulk fuel installation.