Marshall aid - the right perspective

With reference to the letter by Stephen Agius (November 4), I wish to say that the notion that Marshall aid was born out of an act of American generosity is a very simplistic way of describing an event that had little to do with generosity and much to do with self- preservation.

The Marshall plan came about through a series of events that forced America to take action. It certainly was not a case of a rich, magnanimous country dispensing charity to the poor nations of Europe and expecting in return permanent gratitude and ever abiding loyalty.

In 1945, soon after the end of World War Two, America quite naturally wanted to enjoy the peace and to relax from the war-time tribulations. In the immediate post-war period, the US experienced no shortages and none of the troubles of continental Europe where military invasions and counter-invasions had wrought havoc causing widespread destruction, a considerable drop in production, rising unemployment and lack of food and fuel.

American troops were being withdrawn from Europe and returning home. There was a rapid demobilisation of American armed forces and the huge war machine of May, 1945 disintegrated within a few months.

In recalling those days , in an address to an audience at the Pentagon in 1950, General George Marshall had this to say: "I remember, when I was Secretary of State, I was being pressed constantly, particularly when in Moscow, by radio message after radio message, to give the Russians hell... At that time, my facilities for giving them hell - and I am a soldier and know something about the ability to give hell - was one and one-third divisions over the entire United States. This is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with over 260 army divisions. We had nothing in Alaska. We did not have enough to defend the air strip at Fairbanks...".

After the war, the Americans assumed that there was no need of a strong presence in Europe as the United Nations would take care of future international rivalries. American faith in the UN was coupled by a strong desire "to get out" of Europe and "get out of" Asia. The world should return to its pre-war habits, nations should stand on their own feet and get off the US taxpayer's back.

But the Russians had different ideas. Co-existence was turning out to be a utopian American dream.

The first verbal clashes arose when President Truman, soon after entering the White House, realised that American dealings with Russia had been a "one-way street". The period 1945-46 marked the lowest point of American diplomacy. Never in the 20th century had American prestige fallen so low in Europe. And this after the tremendous victory of 1945. Diplomacy without military backing is not effective. The nuclear option was not on the cards.

By the early spring of 1947, it was obvious that Soviet American wartime friendship turned into hostility and cold war. The nations of eastern Europe had fallen like ninepins under complete Communist control and the Soviet Union barely disguised its intention of taking over the whole continent.

In the face of this impending disaster, President Truman had only one course of action left to prevent it from happening, i.e., a programme of economic and military aid to any country that was under threat of subversion and aggression by the Soviet Union. The Truman doctrine, as this policy became known, was only the first of a series of American moves against the USSR's expansionist policies.

The Marshall Plan went into operation in April 1948 and lasted till June 1952. It was a noble idea and effort but there had been a fair amount of opposition to the plan as some American politicians thought that it would spread bankruptcy from Europe to America. The forcible takeover of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in 1948 accelerated the passage of the plan through the American Congress.

The total expenditure was $13,348,800,000, which was divided between Britain, France, Italy, Germany and others. Mr Agius has described the Marshall plan as a "massive" economic aid. In fact, the total cost represented a modest sum compared to the near $1,000,000,000,000 income of the American economy during that same period.

It was calculated that the plan expenditures were only a fraction of America's liquor bill over the same period. Among the Great Powers, the United States was the only country which became richer - in fact much richer - rather than poorer because of the war. At its conclusion, Washington possessed gold reserves of $20 billion, almost two thirds of the world's total of $33 billion.

The American investment in the Marshall plan paid off handsomely as Europe by 1952 was back on its feet. Soon the European countries were able to trade with the US and they provided a rich outlet for American products. The post-war slump that was much feared by the Americans was avoided and a strong military alliance with Europe against the Soviet Union was forged. From an enemy Germany was metamorphosed into a most cherished ally and Nato provided a security system not only for Europe but for the US as well.

If one follows Mr Agius's rationale that a country should be for ever thankful and permanently loyal to another because of "favours" received, then surely the US should be forever grateful to France and never dissent with French actions for the US owes its very existence to France.

Without French intervention, the American colonial rebels would have had no chance of winning the war against Britain. A steady stream of military supplies and other essentials such as cannons, mortars, muskets, gunpowder, surgical instruments, tents, medicines of every sort, money and other items which the American colonists lacked, originated from French sources.

It is impossible to overemphasise the importance of French support for the American revolution, for without the munitions sent to America in 1776 and 1777 the revolt would have collapsed. The battle of Saratoga was won with French muskets and powder. After 1778 the open assistance of French troops and ships made possible the final triumph of American arms, the victory at Yorktown in 1781, in which more Frenchmen participated than Americans.

Today America and Europe need each other as they did after World War Two. We share the same values and hopes for the future. But that does not mean that there can be no dissent and disagreement. Europe has every right to have its own institutions, its own army, complementary to Nato and not be totally subservient to the US. No one is infallible and the corrective effect of constructive censure and criticism must never be underestimated.