Here's how what the EU decides about Turkey will affect Malta

At the summit that begins today, one of the pressing problems that the EU leaders will need to address is that of Turkey. The country wants a definite date for the beginning of accession talks. It has rejected a Franco-German offer of a date, July 2005, to discuss a date. And the EU cannot just fob Turkey off.

Turkey looms large both in the process of enlargement and that of further European integration. It is essential to any resolution to the problem of divided Cyprus. While in principle Cyprus can enter the EU in its present state, it would be massively better if it entered as a reunited country. Second, the EU's plans for a European rapid reaction force would proceed more smoothly if Turkey lifted its veto, as a Nato member, on letting the EU use Nato equipment.

While the importance of these questions might be evident, how they affect Malta might be less immediate. It is true that the problem of divided Cyprus was a factor in stalling Malta's application to join the EU. But we're out of that wood now.

However, Turkey's candidature raises questions about the future development of the EU and its impact on Malta's southern neighbours. Malta, in or out of the EU, will have to develop a perspective on Turkey's EU ambition. It will need to contribute, if only in a quiet way, to the debate to further its point of view. But to do this it will need to see through two myths about Turkey's candidature.

The first myth concerns the identity of Turkey's Islamist movement. It currently finds expression in Teyyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) that is in government, but it has had a number of predecessors. It is a myth that this movement represents an Islamist reaction against globalisation, somewhat more precariously connected to the western values of the free market and democracy than the Turkish secularist parties that it recently thrashed at the polls.

The Islamist movement in Turkey represents, rather, the initial erosion of the Turkish state's authoritarianism. The Islamists have survived several threats against their political organisation, particularly from the military. Although the Islamists have begun to attract certain segments of the young, urban vote, their traditional base lies in the provinces, in unequal regional economic development, and in provincial small and medium businessmen's resentment of the crony capitalism run from the capital city. The name of the present party, Justice and Development, reflects the concerns of this electoral base.

The Islamist movement has rested on the large-scale financing that has come from SMEs, especially from Anatolia. Some of the key political-economic instincts of the movement reflect this SME base. It tends to be anti-labour union, and wants the state to be radically downsized, for example. In short, if the identity of the current Turkish government raises any questions for Europe, one surely is whether it subscribes Europe's version of capitalism.

This leads to the second myth. It would be misleading to see the European debate about Turkey's candidature as a debate between Christian chauvinists and progressives.

The people who have spoken out against Turkey's preparedness for EU membership, such as the German Christian Democrats, can readily see what Turkey's membership would do for the logic of peace. The umbrella of democracies with adjoining borders and committed to creating a security zone against terrorism would grow wider.

But they can also see what Turkey's membership would do to the logic of integration and transparency. It would practically derail it. It is already difficult enough to get English voters to accept that their political agenda might be shaped by German voters. How will they accept, in the foreseeable future, that the agenda might be shaped by Turkish votes?

Not at all well. The recent Eurobarometer polls indicate that Turkey is the most unpopular of the candidate countries, with 47 per cent against its membership, and only 31per cent in favour.

The issue of Turkey's membership therefore drives a wedge between two ideals of the EU that were thought to be inseparable: peace-creation and integration. And the issue spelt out in this way requires Maltese politicians to assess what it would mean for our end of the Mediterranean.

Turkey's membership of the EU would, in principle, reopen Morocco's hopes for membership. It would certainly alter the terms of the Euro-Med partnership, and perhaps lead to a richer EU engagement with the region.

However, this would not necessarily be positive: Turkey's Muslim identity might be less relevant than its identity as a former coloniser of North Africa (bar Morocco). In addition, a pro-US Turkey (as it currently is), in its form of capitalism and in its defensive instincts, would certainly affect the EU's capacity to formulate a Mediterranean policy that was a real alternative to the US one.

These then are the issues that Maltese politicians have to grapple with. They are not easy. There may not be too much time in which to sort them out. And Malta had better be positioned to have the ear of Europe when it comes to voice its own opinion.