Implications of commission's stand

No one doubted that part of the fallout of last summer's judicial debacle would bring about a reaffirmation of what we wanted out of the men and women chosen to serve as judges. Weren't you just startled though when it transpired that, apparently, we didn't want integrity, honesty and a serious set of brains above all else? The doubts cast by the Commission for the Administration of Justice on André Camilleri's fitness to serve as a judge left many, though not all, lawyers mystified.

Those of us who disagree with the commission are now attempting to understand its implications: are only those who regularly practise in court eligible nominees? Are those who work with companies, in boardrooms rather than court rooms, less legal somehow? So if you work hard to reach settlements out of court and avoid the hassle and costs and sheer waste of time and resources, what instruments are you applying? Not the codes, it seems.

Not everybody disagrees with the commission of course. Dr Kevin Dingli wrote to express his conviction that it acted properly.

In criticising his analysis I want to be, above all, fair. I will therefore quote directly from his piece where necessary. Kevin makes a link between the constitutional requirement for eligibility to hold judicial office and the legal requirements relative to the practice of law in court.

He rightly points out that the Constitution requires a judge to have practised as an advocate for not less than 12 years and states that the highest law in the land "does not expand on that".

He then explains that according to the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, no person may exercise the profession of advocate in the courts of justice without the authority of the President of Malta granted by warrant.

Bewilderingly, he concludes that "the profession of advocate, therefore, is to be exercised in the courts of justice in Malta". I see absolutely no causal link between the two and certainly no justification for him to "therefore" his statement.

If any inference is to be made it is, limitedly, that the warrant is the sine qua non for practising in court. It is not the sine qua non for practising, that is, giving legal advice, per se.

The Constitution requires a judge to have practised for 12 years, not held a warrant and practised in court for 12 years. It is silent on the kind of professional activity you pursue during the required 12 years of practice, and the Commission would have served us better had it remained equally mute on the matter.

By his reasoning, Dr Dingli is telling us that the President of the Republic, ultimate protector of the Constitution, has just broken it. Indeed, and this is the dark beauty of it all, Guido de Marco actually did sign André Camilleri's appointment to the judiciary.

By Dr Dingli's reasoning the President appointed a man who did not have the necessary 12 years of practice. The truth is that Dr Camilleri is eminently qualified to serve.

Why he should want to, at a time when assuming this office means carrying a heavy mantle, is another matter. In any event, the President who doubted him, then appointed him, effectively making it untenable for him to stay.

To be sure, it is we who are the poorer for it. Meanwhile, Dr Dingli, who says that the profession of advocates is exercised in the courts, must illuminate me when we next meet in South Street. Indeed, what profession exactly is exercised by doctors of law when they assist their clients out of the courts of justice?

Is there any sort of threshold that somebody is about to determine as the factor keeping us in or out?

Twenty sessions in court every year, Sapiano, or you're a dentist!